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Observations of Several Officers Taken
as a Whole Can Establish the Articulable Facts
Necessary to Justify a Protective Sweep
of an Area Not Immediately Adjacent to an Arrest
Site, but the Area Searched Must be Determined
With Regard to the Exigencies of the Situation:
Commonwealth v. Taylor
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE MENT -

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES -

PROTECTIVE SWEEPS -

FOURTH AMEND-

ZONE OF IMMEDIATE CONTROL -

STOP

AND FRISK - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the facts
articulated by several police officers demonstrated that a search of
the basement of a convenience store, not described in the warrant
for the search of the store, was a valid protective sweep justified
by the reasonable safety fears of the police officers. The court
further held that a pill bottle removed from an individual's pocket
while conducting a legal quick frisk of the individual was justified
because the officer believed the bottle to be a weapon. However,
the court held that contraband found in the coats of two
individuals in the basement was not admissible as evidence
because the coats were outside of the zone of the individuals'
immediate control.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 2001)
On January 20, 1995, the Duquesne Police Department executed a
search warrant authorizing the search of the G Service
Convenience Store at 418 Crawford Avenue. 1 The search warrant
was issued upon information gathered through surveillance of the
G Service Convenience Store and a confidential informant's
2
controlled purchase of crack cocaine from the store.
Prior to entering the store, Officer Richard Scott Adams saw
Anthony Taylor and John Mahone 3 enter the store on the first
level. 4 Upon entering the store, police encountered only Eric
1. Conunonwealth v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261. 1264 (Pa. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1268. The caption in full reflects that this appeal is the consolidation of two
appeals, that of Anthony Taylor, and that of John Mahone, Jr. Id. at 1261.
4. Id. at 1268.
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Gooden, with a large quantity of crack cocaine. 5 Officer Adams and
another officer then proceeded down a set of stairs into the
basement of the building where they found Mahone cutting Taylor's
hair.6 Noticing Taylor's hands moving under the apron he was
wearing, and fearing that Taylor could be reaching for a weapon,
7
Officer Adams removed the apron and patted Taylor's pocket.
Feeling a hard object in Taylor's pocket, Officer Adams removed
what turned out to be a pill bottle filled with crack cocaine.8 After
both Mahone and Taylor were handcuffed, Constable Gordon
McIntyre searched their coats, which were draped over a chair
approximately ten feet from the men.9 The search of the coats
revealed more crack cocaine in Taylor's coat and several bags of
marijuana in Mahone's coat. 0
Taylor and Mahone were charged with possession of a controlled
substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver." Subsequently, they filed motions to suppress the evidence
seized from them during the search of the basement of the G
Service Convenience Store.' 2 The suppression court held that the
search of Taylor and Mahone in the basement of the store had
exceeded the scope of the warrant, which was issued for the
search of the G Service Convenience Store, and accordingly
suppressed the evidence. 3 Believing that the suppression of the
evidence substantially handicapped its case, the Commonwealth
certified that fact in good faith and appealed to the superior
court. 4 In reversing the decision of the suppression court, the
superior court held that although the search of the basement was
in fact outside the scope of the warrant as issued, the search of the
basement was valid as a protective sweep of the premises after the
15
arrest of Gooden.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petitions of Taylor
5. Id. at 1264. Gooden is not a party to this appeal.
6. Taylor, 771 A.2d at 1264. The basement also contained some hair-cutting equipment
and one barber's chair in addition to the barber's chair that Taylor was sitting in. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Taylor, 771 A.2d at 1265.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(d) provides in pertinent part, "in
a criminal case ... the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that
does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that
the order will ... substantially handicap the prosecution." Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
15. Taylor, 771 A.2d at 1265.
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and Mahone for Allowance of Appeal to determine whether the
searches conducted in the basement of the G Service Convenience
Store were outside the scope of the warrant, and if they were,
whether they were reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 6 Justice Newman
delivered the opinion of the court, which held that the searches
conducted in the basement of the convenience store were outside
the scope of the warrant.1 7 The court went on to hold that the
search of the basement was valid as a protective sweep subsequent
to the arrest of Gooden, and that the pill bottle confiscated from
Taylor was discovered during a valid Terry8 frisk, thus upholding
these aspects of the superior court's decision.19 The majority
further held, however, that the search of the coats could not be
upheld as a valid search incident to arrest and the evidence
discovered in the coats was correctly suppressed, thus reversing
20
that aspect of the superior court's decision.
The court first addressed the issue of whether the search of the
basement was outside the scope of the warrant. 21 The warrant
executed by the Duquesne Police Department was valid for the
search of the G Service Convenience Store, but the affidavit of
probable cause upon which it was issued made no mention of the
basement barbershop.2
Justice Newman agreed with the
suppression court that the basement barbershop was a separate
entity from the G Service Convenience Store, and that without the
existence of probable cause to believe that there was drug activity
in the basement, the barbershop was outside the scope of the
warrant2 The majority, however, went on to hold that because the
police may have reasonably believed that they were in danger of
harm from other persons on the premises, the basement, being the
only access to the store other than the front entrance, could be
16. Id. at 1265. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
17. 7ylor, 771 at 1266.
18. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court held in Terry that a police officer may
conduct a quick search of a person that he fears may be carrying a weapon in order that the
officer may find such weapon. Id.
19. Taylor, 771 A2d at 1273.
20. Id. at 1273.
21. Id. at 1265.
22.

Id.

23.

Id. at 1266.

Duquesne Law Review

594

Vol. 40:591

lawfully searched as a protective sweep.24 The court further stated
that the reasonable belief that the officers were in danger must be
based on articulable facts, considered along with the inferences
that can be drawn from those facts that would cause a reasonably
prudent officer in similar circumstances to believe the same. 25 That
standard was satisfied in this case, Justice Newman stated, because
Officer Adams saw Taylor and Mahone enter the store, but when
the police entered, Taylor and Mahone were not present on the first
floor.

26

After determining that the search of the basement was a valid
protective sweep, the court turned its attention to the validity of
the search of Taylor. The majority first stated that if a police officer
reasonably believes that a suspect is carrying a dangerous weapon,
the officer may conduct a quick frisk of the suspect in order to
find the weapon. 27 The court found that because Taylor continued
reaching for his pocket underneath the apron he was wearing,
despite repeated warnings from Officer Adams to stop moving,
Officer Adams was justified in touching Taylor's pocket to
determine if he had a weapon. 2s Further, the Justice Newman
reasoned that Officer Adams was justified in pulling what turned
out to be a pill bottle from Taylor's pocket because, although the
purpose of a quick frisk is not to discover evidence,29 Officer
Adams believed the pill bottle may have been a weapon. 3°
After finding that both the search of the basement and of Taylor
were valid, the court examined the validity of the searches of
Taylor and Mahone's coats that were hanging approximately ten
31
feet from the men who had already been handcuffed and secured.
Justice Newman first established that, incident to arrest, a police
24. Taylor, 771 A.2d at 1266. The court went on to explain that there are two levels of
protective sweeps. Id. at 1267. The first allows police to make visual inspections of areas
adjacent to the arrest scene that could hide an attacker without even reasonable suspicion.
Id. The second, which the search of the basement falls into, allows police, upon articulation
of specific facts that give rise to a reasonable fear for their safety, to search areas further
away from the place of arrest for possible attackers. Id.
25. Id. at 1267-68.
26. Id. at 1268.
27. Id. at 1268-69.
28. Taylor, 771 A.2d at 1269.
29. Id. at 1269. The court explained that under the "plain feel" doctrine, an officer is
justified in removing from a suspect's person an object that the officer knows to not be a
weapon only when it is immediately apparent when conducting the quick frisk that the
object is contraband. Id. at 1269 n.4 (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76

(1993)).
30.
31.

Taylor, 771 A.2d at 1269.
Id. at 1271.
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officer may conduct a search of those areas within the immediate
control of the arrestee.3 2 As the court explained, the limits of the
area within the immediate control of the arrestee are determined
through an examination of the exigencies that justify the initiation
of the search.3a Here, Taylor and Mahone had been handcuffed and
secured ten feet from where the coats were hanging.34 The court
concluded that because the coats were well beyond the reach of
Taylor and Mahone, and because there was no reason for the police
to believe that either Taylor or Mahone would attempt to destroy
contraband or secure a weapon from the coats, the coats were not
in an area within the immediate control of the arrestees and thus
the search of the coats was invalid.3
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Nigro wrote that
he agreed with the judgment of the court that the search of the
basement was outside the scope of the warrant. 6 He disagreed,
however, with the judgment of the court that the search of the
basement was valid as a protective sweep.37 In Justice Nigro's
opinion, the police officers did not articulate facts sufficient to
justify a reasonable belief that they were in danger from anyone
who might be hiding in the basement.a3 Furthermore, even if he
conceded that the search of the basement was a valid protective
sweep, Justice Nigro concluded that once Officer Adams, while
patting Taylor's pocket, determined that the object in the pocket
was not a gun or a knife, he was not justified in removing the pill
bottle from Taylor's pocket.39
All searches and seizures without a warrant are not necessarily
in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the Fourth
Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures
only.4° The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio expressly
carved one of the first exceptions to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment out 4 1 Terry was convicted of carrying a
concealed weapon after he was stopped and frisked by a police
32.

Id.

33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at. 1272.
Taylor, 771 A.2d at 1273.

36.

Id. (Nigro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

37. Id. at 1274 (Nigro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. Id. (Nigro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Nigro stated that
the Commonwealth's witnesses explained only that they entered the basement because it
was easily accessible to the convenience store. Id. at 1274 n.2 (Nigro, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
39. Id. at 1275 n.5 (Nigro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
41. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
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officer that suspected that Terry, along with two other men, might
be contemplating the robbery of a store.42 The officer stopped the
three men, identified himself as a police officer, and asked them
for their names.4 Not having received a satisfactory response to his
question, the officer took hold of Terry and proceeded to pat down
the outside of his clothing!4 Feeling a gun in the pocket of Terry's
coat, the officer removed the coat and took the gun from the
pocket.'5
The Terry Court characterized the issue as "whether it is always
unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to
a limited search for weapons [when the officer does not have]
probable cause for an arrest."46 To determine whether the search
conducted by the officer on Terry was reasonable, the United
States Supreme Court stated that it was necessary to weigh the
government's interest in performing the search against an
individual's right to be secure in their person. 47 The majority held
that when a police officer observes conduct which arouses
reasonable suspicion that a person may be engaged in criminal
behavior, and after reasonable inquiries is not relieved of his
reasonable fear for his safety or the safety of others, the officer
may conduct a pat down of the outer clothing of the individual to
discover any weapons that the person may be carrying, without
violating the Fourth Amendment. 48 The Court did not discuss the
limitations of its holding; rather, it left them to be developed in
42. Id. at 4-7. The officer witnessed Terry and another man, joined at one point by a
third man, walking back and forth in front of a store window approximately a dozen times,
each time stopping to peer in the store window and then briefly engaging in conversation
before repeating the same motions. Id. at 4-7.
43. Id. at 6-7.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id. The officer then went on the pat down the other two men, finding a gun in the
pocket of one of their coats, but no weapons on the other. Id. The officer testified that he
was only patting the men down to determine if they had weapons and only placed his hands
under the garments of the men after he felt their guns. Id.
46. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. The Court explained that when a police officer stops an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, the officer has seized that person. Id. at
16. The Court then determined that the officer had "seized [Terry] and subjected him to a
'search' when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing." Id. at
19.
47. Id. at 20-21. The Court cautioned that the government's interest in performing the
search is more than that of simply investigating crime; it is also that of the police officer
being able to take steps to be sure that the person with whom he is dealing does not
possess a weapon that could be used against him. Id. at 23.
48. Id. at 30-31. The Court stated that reasonable suspicion must be judged against an
objective standard of whether, with the facts available to the officer at the time his suspicion
is aroused, an officer of reasonable caution would believe that the actions taken were
appropriate; simple good faith is not sufficient. Id. at 21-22.
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later cases.49
In United States v. Cortez6" the Court was faced with the
problem of how it should determine whether a law enforcement
official has reasonable suspicion to stop a person.5 1 In this case,
border patrol officers stopped a truck driven by Cortez that they
suspected was transporting illegal aliens into the United States
from Mexico.5 2 In the back of the truck, the officers found six
illegal aliens, and therefore proceeded to arrest Cortez for the
transportation of illegal aliens.63 Cortez argued that the officers did
not have proper cause to stop his vehicle based on simply the
circumstantial evidence and inferences from it that the officers had
made. 54
The Cortez Court explained that reasonable suspicion should be
determined from the totality of circumstances, and based upon the
whole picture, the officer conducting a stop must have an objective
basis for believing that the person being stopped is involved in
criminal activity.5 The majority then held that the border patrol
officers had reasonable suspicion that the truck they stopped was
involved in criminal activity, and thus, based upon the totality of
the evidence they had, and the inferences they could draw
therefrom, they were justified in stopping the truck.5
The United States Supreme Court was again required to revisit
its stop-and-frisk doctrine in Minnesota v. Dickerson.57 The issue in
this case was whether a police officer may seize items other than
weapons found on a person while conducting a valid pat-down
search for weapons. 58 The majority held that if, during the course
49. Id. at 29.
50. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
51. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 412-13.
52. Id. at 415. The Court first discussed a substantial amount of circumstantial
evidence that the border patrol officers had gathered over a 2-month period of investigating
the suspected transporting of illegal aliens into the United States. Id. at 413-15. The evidence
was discussed to lay a foundation for the inference that the officers had drawn from it,
which was that the truck that they stopped would contain the answers to their 2-month
investigation. Id.
53. Id. at 416.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 417-18.
56. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 421-22.
57. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
58. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373. Dickerson was stopped by police officers upon
reasonable suspicion and subjected to a valid patdown search. Id. at 368-69. During the
course of the search, the officer conducting the search felt a lump in Dickerson's pocket. Id.
at 369. The identity of the lump not being immediately apparent, the officer proceeded to
manipulate it with his fingers until he was satisfied that it was crack cocaine wrapped in
cellophane. Id. The officer then removed the crack and arrested Dickerson for possession of
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of a valid pat-down search, the officer feels an object whose
identity is immediately apparent as contraband, the officer is
justified in removing the object and using it as evidence against the
individual.59 The Court explained that, while the purpose of a
pat-down search of this type is only to discover weapons, not to
discover evidence of criminal behavior, ° an object felt during the
course of a pat-down search that is immediately identified as
contraband by the officer may be seized without a warrant upon
the same justifications that support the plain-view doctrine.6 1 .
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had occasion to review a case
dealing with the "stop-and-frisk" and "plain feel" doctrines in
Commonwealth v. Graham.62 While executing an arrest warrant for
one of Graham's companions, a police officer saw a bulge in
Graham's front pocket.6 Concerned for his safety, the officer patted
Graham down, and in the course of doing so the officer shined a
flashlight into Graham's back pocket and saw a Lifesavers Holes
bottle filled with crack cocaine, removed it, and arrested Graham
for possession of crack cocaine.64
After determining that the police officer was justified in
performing a protective pat-down search of Graham to alleviate his
concern for his safety,6 the court went on to find that the officer
had exceeded the scope of a permissive pat-down search when he
shined the flashlight into Graham's pocket and saw the Lifesavers
Holes bottle.6 The court held that once the pat-down reveals that a
person is not carrying a weapon, any subsequent manipulation of
items in the person's clothing is outside the scope of a valid
protective pat-down search.67 The court further held that the
plain-feel doctrine will only support the seizure of items that are
immediately known to the officer as contraband based solely on
the officer's initial pat down of a person without the aid of a
a controlled substance. Id.
59. Id. at 375-76.
60. Id. at 373.
61. Id. at 375-76. "[The] [pilain-view doctrine [is a] rule permitting a police officer's
warrantless seizure and use as evidence of an item observed in plain view from a lawful
position or during a legal search when the officer has probable cause to believe that the item
is evidence of a crime." BLAcK's LAw DICTONARY 938 (7th ed. 1999).
62. 721 A.2d 1075 (1998).
63. Graham, 721 A.2d at 1076.
64. Id. at 1076-77. The officer had ascertained the bulge in Graham's front pocket to be
money, and in continuing the search felt what he believed to be a Lifesavers Holes bottle in
Graham's back pocket. Id. at 1076.
65. Id. at 1077.
66. Id. at 1079-80.
67. Id. at 1082.
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flashlight or other such items. s
In Chimel v. California,69 the United States Supreme Court was
required to examine the scope of a search incident to a valid
arrest. 70 In this case, police officers arrived at the home of Chimel
in order to execute a warrant for his arrest. 7' After giving the
warrant to Chimel, the officers asked him if they could search his
home, telling him that because he had been lawfully arrested they
would search the home with or without his. consent. 72 The officers
then proceeded to search the entire house, directing Chimel's wife
to open drawers and move the contents of them so that the officers
might find evidence of the crime for which Chimel was being
arrested.7 3
The Court framed the issue as "whether the warrantless search
of the petitioner's entire house can be constitutionally justified as
incident to [a lawful] arrest."74 The majority held that the
warrantless search of petitioner's entire house cannot be
75
constitutionally justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest.
The Court explained that this limitation is necessary because the
justification of a search incident to arrest is to discover weapons or
evidence that may be destroyed by the arrestee if not found at the
time of arrest.7 6 The opinion then extended, under the same
justification, the scope of a search incident to arrest to include the
area within the arrestee's immediate control from which he might
77
be able to acquire a weapon or destructible evidence.
Although the United States Supreme Court had already examined
the scope of a search of a person incident to a valid arrest, 78 the
Court did not expressly establish an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment for such a search until
United States v. Robinson.7 9 The validity of a search of a person
68. Graham, 721 A.2d at 1082.
69. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
70. Chime, 395 U.S. at 753. Although this case was decided before Robinson the
search incident to arrest exception had been regarded as settled and remained unchallenged
until Robinson, in which the Court expressly set the exception forth. United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
71. Chime, 395 U.S. at 753.
72. Id. at 753-54.
73. Id. at 754. The search lasted between 45 minutes and an hour to complete and the
items taken from Chimel's house were introduced as evidence at his trial. Id.
74. Id. at 755.
75. Id. at 768.
76. Chime, 395 U.S. at 763.
77. Id. at 763.
78. Id.
79. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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incident to a lawful arrest had been regarded as settled from its
first enunciation, however, the validity of such a search had not
been challenged until this case.8 0 The issue in this case was
whether, after a valid arrest, the arresting officer may subject the
arrestee to a search of his person in order to discover either
weapons or evidence of a crime.8 ' The Court explained that a
search of a person incident to a lawful arrest is necessary not only
to protect the arresting officer from any weapons that the arrestee
may be carrying, but also to preserve evidence on his person that
may be destroyed if not found when the officer places him under
arrest.8 2 The majority held that "in the case of a lawful custodial
arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a
'reasonable' search under that Amendment."3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Norris, 4
recognized the exigency created by hidden third parties during an
arrest.8 5 Norris was arrested by police officers in his apartment,
which a woman across the hall had told the police was occupied
by both Norris and his brother.8a Norris was arrested in the living
room of the apartment, but his brother's presence was unaccounted
for in that room.87 The court stated that it could not expect the
officers to refrain from looking in the bedrooms of the apartment
when they had reason to believe that they may be in danger from a
person concealed therein 88 The whereabouts of Norris' brother
being uncertain, the court held that the officers had a right, due to
the exigencies of the situation, to search the bedrooms of the
apartment in order to determine whether Norris' brother was hiding
80. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224. Robinson was arrested for operating a motor vehicle
after revocation of his license and for obtaining a permit through misrepresentation. Id. at
220. After arresting Robinson, the arresting officer proceeded to conduct a search of
Robinson's person. Id. at 222. During the search, the officer felt a crumpled up cigarette
pack in Robinson's pocket, removed it, opened it and discovered a quantity of heroin inside
which was admitted as evidence at Robinson's trial. Id. at 223.
81. Id. at 223-24.
82. Id. at 234.
83. Id. at 235.
84. 446 A-2d 246 (Pa. 1982).
85. Norris, 446 A.2d at 248.
86. Id. at 248. Norris was suspected of raping a twelve-year old girl, who gave a
description of the apartment building where Norris could be found. Id. at 247-48. The entry
into Norris' apartment and the arrest made thereupon entering the apartment were made
without a warrant, but the court determined that the officers were justified in both entering
the apartment and arresting Norris due to the exigency of the situation Id. at 248.
87. Id. at 249.
88. Id. The court stated that the officers also had every reason to believe that a
firearm was available to the occupants of the apartment. Id.
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in one of the rooms, in order to keep the officers safe from
danger.89
The United States Supreme Court established a further extension
of the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth
Amendment, the protective sweep, in Maryland v. Buie.9° Police
officers executed an arrest warrant for Buie at his home.91 During
the search, one of the officers twice yelled into the basement for
anyone down there to come out; a voice from the basement asked
who was yelling, and finally, after the officer identified himself
three times, Buie emerged from the basement.9 Subsequently,
another officer entered the basement to make sure that no one else
was down there.9 3 In the basement, the officer found a red sweat
suit that Buie had been suspected of wearing during the robbery
for which he was being arrested for, and the sweat suit was
introduced as evidence at Buie's trial9 4
The Court framed the issue as "what level of justification the
Fourth Amendment required before [the officer] could legally enter
the basement to see if someone else was there."95 The Court
explained that police officers have a legitimate interest in being
sure that a house in which a person has just been, or is just being,
arrested does not contain individuals who may pose a danger to
the officers effectuating the arrest.9 The Court went on to hold
that without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, an officer
conducting a lawful arrest may look in spaces immediately
adjoining the place of arrest in which an assailant could be hiding;
this is a level one protective sweep.9 7 The Court further held,
however, that beyond the above stated places, there must be
articulable facts that cause an officer to reasonably believe that the
area to be searched as a protective sweep contains individuals that
pose a danger to those on the scene of the arrest; this is a level
two protective sweep.9 8 The Court cautioned, however, that a
protective sweep lasts no longer than is necessary to remove an
89.

Id.

90. 494 U.S. 325 (1990). A protective sweep is "a police officer's quick and limited
search - conducted after the officer has lawfully entered the premises - based on a
reasonable belief that such a search is necessary to protect the officer or others from harm."
BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 992 (7th ed. 1999).
91. Buie, 494 U.S. at 328.
92. Id. at 328.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 330.
Buie, 494 U.S. at 333.
Id. at 334.
Id.
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officer's reasonable suspicion of danger.9
The court's holding in Commonwealth v. Taylor followed
long-standing precedent regarding the validity of warrantless
searches under the Fourth Amendment. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reaffirmed the validity of a protective sweep incident to
arrest first established by the United States Supreme Court in Buie.
Examining both levels of sweeps established by Buie, the court
determined that the search of the basement in this case fit the
second level of sweep, and thus required the articulation of specific
facts upon which a reasonable fear for the safety of the police
officers could be justified.1l 0
With the holding in Taylor, it seems that the court changed the
requirements for a level two protective sweep set forth in Buie by
allowing testimony of several officers taken together as a whole to
serve as the articulable factual basis for justifying the sweep. The
Buie Court explained that a protective sweep of the type
conducted in the present case is justified if the officer conducting
the sweep can articulate specific facts that give rise to a reasonable
fear for the safety of the officer. 0 1 The Taylor court however,
considered facts offered through the testimony of several officers,
including officers who were not involved in conducting the sweep,
to justify its initiation. 1 2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed precedent on the
long-standing principle of the "stop-and-frisk" first established by
the United States Supreme Court in Terry. With its holding in
Taylor, the court reassured police officers that they are entitled to
exercise discretion as to whether they should conduct a quick frisk
of a person who they believe may be carrying a weapon that could
pose a threat to the officer while conducting his or her duties.
Although the court held that Officer Adams was justified in
removing the pill bottle from Anthony Taylor's pocket, others might
disagree. °3 It seems that since the pill bottle was not immediately
recognizable to Officer Adams as contraband, the seizure of the pill
bottle should have been handled under the plain-feel doctrine set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Dickerson. The Court
declined, however, to enter into a plain-feel doctrine analysis in
99.

Id. at 335.

100. Taylor, 771 A.2d at 1266-67.
101. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 (emphasis added).
102. 7ylor, 771 A-2d at 1268.
103. Id. at 1275. Justice Nigro argues that once Officer Adams determined that the
object in Anthony Taylor's pocket was not a gun or a knife; he was not justified in removing
the pill bottle. Id. (Nigro, Zappala, JJ. and Flaherty, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
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this case because Justice Newman found that Officer Adams
reasonably believed that the object in Anthony Taylor's pocket was
a weapon.'04
Finally, the highest court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed the limits of
the area within the immediate control of a person that may be
searched incident to a valid arrest. The holding in Taylor cautions
police officers that the area that may be searched incident to a
valid arrest is circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation.
Whether or not one agrees with every aspect of the court's
holding in Taylor, the court's decision was based on firmly
established precedent and will be useful in several ways. First, it
reassures police officers that they may exercise reasonable
discretion in ascertaining whether a person they suspect of being
involved in criminal activity is carrying a weapon. Second, it allows
the use of facts gathered by several officers at the scene of a
search to serve as the basis for a protective sweep. Finally, it
affirms the principle that although a person has been subjected to a
legal arrest, he still retains some rights under the Fourth
Amendment, and police officers must determine the area to be
searched incident to arrest with due regard to the exigencies of the
situation.
Barry J. Clegg

104. Id. at 1269 n.4.

